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Abstract
This paper estimates the causal effect of temporary work agency (TWA) employment
on the subsequent probability of employment in the regular labor market. The main
purpose is to estimate the stepping-stone effect separately for natives and immigrants,
where the latter group potentially benefits the most from TWA employment. Since no
quasi-experiment is available, individual Differences-in-Differences and matching is
used to deal with the potential selection bias. The results point at a negative regular
employment effect, which slowly fades away over a couple of years. Thus no evidence
of a stepping-stone effect is found. When conditioning on immigrants, this negative
effect is absent. A long-run significant effect is found on overall employment
probability (including TWA employment), there is even a long-run positive effect on
annual earnings (mainly driven by women). Unemployment probabilities decreased,
however the results in the estimation were less stable over time compared to the
employment estimates, suggesting that the TWAs might keep individuals from exiting
the labor market.
Keywords: Temporary work agencies; Stepping stone; Labor market; Matching
1 Introduction
The growth of temporary working agencies (TWAs) in Sweden and Europe has been rapid
since the 1990s and the sector is still expanding in Sweden. The 2011 level of penetration1
was about 1.4% (Bemanningsföretagen 2011) which amounted to an all time high: 62,863
employees (yearly full time equivalents). Thus, it is interesting to investigate whether
this development has been of any advantage for the unemployed in terms of increased
transition rates into regular employment.
Undoubtedly the deregulation of the market in 1993 was a major contributor to the
rapid development since it made TWAs legal, only prohibiting agencies from charging
employees for their services and imposing a six months TWA contracting stop if a job
position has been terminated. The driving force behind the temporary work industry
(TWI) is primarily the demand side of the labor market. Increased competitive pressure
has forced employers to change their organizational structure towards the ‘lean’ produc-
tion model: the permanent work force is adjusted to the minimum production levels
and increased demand is met with atypical employment such as temporary workers or
workers hired through a TWA.
© Hveem; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any




Hveem IZA Journal of Migration Page 2 of 27
The rationale for hiring through a TWA instead of recruiting a regular temporary
employee is that there are costs associated with hiring and firing which can be mitigated
by the TWAs. Furthermore, the tasks required at a company might not comprise enough
to constitute even a part-time position. TWAs have the advantage of bundling together
different tasks into one or several employment positions. Since recruiting is the TWAs’
main function, it is argued that they have the advantage of economies of scale, which
would imply that they are more efficient in both the time elapsed until sealing an employ-
ment contract and the quality of the match. This matching efficiency is a theoretical result
by (Neugart and Storrie 2006) and also claimed by the TWI itself. Empirically, there is
however only inconclusive evidence.
Previous studies that in various degrees might lend support to the stepping stone
hypothesis are (Andersson et al. 2007; Ichino et al. 2008; Lane et al. 2003; Summer-
field 2009; Garcia-Perez and Munoz-Bullon 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2008), while
(Kvasnicka 2008) does not find any evidence of such an effect. (Autor and Houseman
2010) takes advantage of a quasi-experimental research design which give a small but
negative result. However, heterogeneous effects with respect to country of birth are not
explored in these studies.
In the Swedish setting, research is scarce on this question and causal inference is as
yet inconclusive. (Andersson and Wadensjö 2004) focus on the TWA’s stepping stone
role for non-European immigrants. Their findings (based on register data) show that
immigrants—in relation to natives—more often leave a TWA for another type of employ-
ment. This could be interpreted in favor of the stepping stone hypothesis. The causal
inference is however weak and mainly relies on reasoning based on probit correlations.
In a recent study, (Jahn and Rosholm 2012) investigate the effect of TWAs on the dura-
tion until exit from unemployment into regular employment for immigrants. They find
significant and positive results when measuring in-treatment effects but nothing signifi-
cant when examining the post-treatment effect. However, when dividing the sample into
smaller groups, such as non-western immigrants, they found a post-treatment effect but
no in-treatment effect2. The study was performed in Denmark, implying that the results
might be applicable to the Swedish labor market since they are not that different from
each other.
There is evidently no real consensus in the field, the results span from positive, none, to
negative, underscoring that this is a relatively unexplored research topic.
When client firms hire personnel from a TWA they assume—after accounting for hiring
and firing costs—that the worker provided is the best possible match and that their own
effort in recruiting would not be able to compete with the TWA’s outcome. One hypothe-
sis is that the TWAs increase the probability of a worker’s gaining permanent employment
in the regular labor market by increasing their human capital, signaling working ambi-
tions, expanding the worker’s network, and serving as a cheap screening device. The last
two effects are especially vital for immigrants since they are likely to be subject to statis-
tical discrimination. The type of screening service that a TWA offers in effect is likely to
be one of the most powerful remedies against statistical discrimination since the client
firm will be able to observe the real productivity without hiring the worker. Since employ-
ers usually have a hard time adequately assessing an immigrant’s abilities, education, and
skills acquired in a different environment, TWAs could be a remedy, working as a cheap
probation device where the uncertainty and risk has been incorporated into the TWA
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itself. It is also reasonable to believe that the immigrant’s working network is weaker than
natives’ and just getting a job helps build up country-specific human capital, such as lan-
guage skills and a deeper knowledge of how the labor market works3. Another reason
to further investigate the effect on immigrants is their over-representation in the indus-
try (Andersson Joona and Wadensjö 2010). All these things taken together give reason to
believe that immigrants may specially benefit from TWA employment. The opposite sign
is of course also possible due to stigmatization. In the present paper I will estimate the
causal impact of employment in a TWA on the medium and long-run transition rate from
unemployment to regular labor market employment, with extra focus on non-western
immigrants4.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the definition of the
treatment group. Section 3 presents the estimation framework and outlines the matching
estimation. The results from the various estimations are reported in Section 4, both for
the matched and the unmatched sample, ending with a brief summary of the robustness
check. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Data
Even though the TWI is growing rapidly it still does not constitute more than approxi-
mately 1.4% of the labor force. Therefore, I will have to use large datasets such as register
databases in order to retrieve a sufficiently large sample. I have access to the composite
register data used in (Andersson and Wadensjö 2004). The main part of the data comes
from the Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labor market studies
(LISA) provided by Statistics Sweden. The composite panel database is balanced and gives
information about, e.g., age, gender, place of birth, education, place of residence, employ-
ment status, annual income, days in unemployment, etc., for about 7.3 million individuals
16–64 years old, covering the years 1997 to 2008, making this study the largest in the
TWA field to date5. Since the research question at hand is whether a TWA works as a
stepping stone out of unemployment into regular employment, identification of the pop-
ulation is based on the unemployment status in November 20016. This means that the
sample under study comprises those unemployed or in a labormarket program inNovem-
ber 2001. Also, individuals older than 55 in 2001 are pruned out of the data in order
to reduce the probability that their subsequent labor market outcome is affected by any
early retirement plan7. Taking treatment is then defined as being registered at a TWA in
November 2002. Subsequent years are recorded as labor market outcomes (see Table 1,
“Appendix C. Description of outcome variables” for a description of the outcomes) or
effect of treatment. The control group comprises those not joining a TWA in November
2002 (when unemployed in 2001), entry in TWA 2003 and onwards is allowed since I do
not want to condition on future outcomes8.
Table 1 Definition of labor market outcomesa
Outcome 1 Annual probability of regular employment
Outcome 2 Annual probability of unemployment
Outcome 3 Annual probability of TWA employment
Outcome 4 Annual probability of employment (TWA or regular)
Outcome 5 Annual earnings
aThe outcomes are not mutually exclusive.
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One drawback of the dataset is that administrative staff is not separately coded with the
workers out for hire. The administrative staff is however a small share of TWA employ-
ment and this issue should not affect the results in any significant way9. Another caveat is
that the data frequency is low, relying on annual observations, which makes the treatment
definition somewhat imprecise due to the absence of employment status information
between the pre-treatment year 2001 and the treatment year 2002. However this will most
likely only affect the precision and not bias the estimates. Another drawback with low fre-
quency data is that we cannot observe the in-treatment effect (the contemporary effect of
treatment): any treatment effect taking place within a year will not be recorded due to the
data structure.
When relying on a selection on observables design, it is crucial to obtain all relevant
pre-treatment observables that might be correlated with both the outcome and the selec-
tion into the treatment equation. The most vital observable is previous unemployment
duration, since this is highly correlated with both the outcome and the selection equation.
Due to the long period covered in the data, much credibility is gained since the parallel
trends assumption can be tested thoroughly. Moreover, deducing the long-run effect can
be done in a more convincing manner than if solely relying on a permanent employment
indicator, since we can follow the individuals over several years into post-treatment.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables and regression-based t-tests
for the treatment and control group (corresponding table for the non-western subsample
is found in Table 4 in the Appendix). The two groups are not balanced inmost dimensions.
The treatment group is younger, has higher education, has on average been unemployed
less, resides in Stockholm and Gothenburg to a greater extent, and has a higher share
of males and natives. These last two facts run counter to the cross-sectional summary
statistics of the population in 2002, where the opposite is true (Andersson and Wadensjö
2004). This is a consequence of the sample selection since I actually identify observations
by flow rather than stock in this paper.
Controlling for the observed characteristics observed in Table 2 parametrically by an
OLS means that obtaining unbiased results heavily relies on correct model specification.
In Figure 1 we can follow different employment outcomes over different sample groups.
The plots show no visible positive effect on the subsequent outcome after treatment by
just comparingmeans. However, when examining incomemeans andmedians in Figure 2,
we seem to detect a positive income effect, although a slight divergence in earnings is
revealed in the early years.
3 Methodology
When trying to estimate causal effects, the main issue is to deal with the selection bias
caused by omitted variables. Eliminating or at least mitigating selection bias is the key to
obtaining unbiased estimates (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Since I do not have access to
a randomized experiment (or a quasi-experiment) two approaches will be used: Individ-
ual fixed effects and matching, both relying on the conditional independence assumption
(CIA).
3.1 Differences-in-Differences
An ideal econometric approach would have been to identify an exogenous variation into
taking treatment or not that would have ensured a causal inference. Since the focus is
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Table 2 Summary statistics for 2001, full sample
Group Differences in means
Control Treatment Coefficient t-statistic
Gender
Male 57.0 65.1 0.082 (17.03)***
Female 43.0 34.9 -0.082 (-17.03)***











Age groups 35 31 -3.430 (-10.75)***
16–20 8.7 12.3 0.022 (8.42)***
21–25 15.4 23.6 0.055 (14.50)***
26–30 15.3 18.8 0.057 (14.05)***
31–35 14.5 15.0 0.017 (4.65)***
36–40 14.9 10.8 -0.018 (-5.56)***
41–45 12.0 8.8 -0.036 (-12.37)***
46–50 10.6 6.0 -0.041 (-15.77)***
51–55 8.6 4.7 -0.040 (-18.31)***
Country of birth
Sweden 73.9 75.0 0.012 (2.69)***
Nordic countries (except Sweden) 3.2 2.8 -0.004 (-2.34)***
EU12 0.9 0.6 -0.003 (-3.79)***
Other European countries 7.0 6.7 -0.003 (-1.23)
Africa 2.2 2.2 -0.000 (-0.23)
North America 0.4 0.4 0.000 (0.72)
South America 1.5 1.7 0.002 (1.44)
Asia 10.7 10.3 -0.004 (-1.25)
Oceania 0.0 0.0 -0.000 (-9.95)***
Soviet Union 0.2 0.2 0.001 (1.15)
Highest education level
Primary school less than 9 years 3.9 1.5 -0.024 (-17.80)***
Primary school 9 (10) years 17.9 14.4 -0.019 (-4.87)***
Upper secondary 2 years or less 34.0 27.5 -0.065 (-14.49)***
Upper secondary 2 years or more 27.2 35.5 0.072 (15.75)***
Higher education less than 3 years 8.6 10.5 0.016 (4.98)***
Higher education 3 years or more 7.3 9.9 0.023 (7.80)***
Post-graduate education 0.2 0.2 -0.001 (-4.59)***
Unknown 1.0 0.6 -0.003 (-3.89)***
Resides in a large city
Stockholm 12.3 19.4 0.076 (18.98)***
Gothenburg 17.0 23.7 0.060 (14.37)***
Malmoe 15.4 10.9 -0.045 (-14.60)***
Other 55.4 46.0 -0.091 (-18.26)***
Number of observations 25,158 953 26,111
Robust standard errors.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Note: Taking treatment is defined as being registered at a TWA in November 2002.
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Figure 1 Summary of outcomes.
on the causal effect of TWA employment (taking treatment) on the subsequent regular
employment probability, I will turn to the difference-in-difference model. When estimat-
ing this model it is crucial that: (i) both groups exhibit parallel trends, (ii) selection into
treatment is conditionally random or at least not correlated with the outcome, and (iii)
nothing else that affects the outcome variable occurs at the same time as the treatment
timing. Since I have not been able to identify an exogenous instrument that selects indi-
viduals into treatment, I instead control for individual effects (exploiting the panel data
structure) which might be correlated with both selection into treatment and the outcome.
However, individual trends cannot be captured by this way of modeling. Another way to
deal with this endogeneity is to employ matching techniques which relies on the CIA. It
states that conditional on observable characteristics, treatment is as good as randomly
assigned, more formally:
T |X ⊥ Y0i (1)
Here, T is getting treatment, X is a set of confounders, and Y0i the potential outcome
if not taking treatment. Having a rich set of observables is, as previously stated, cru-
cial for being able to claim that the CIA holds and thus that the conditional differences-
in-differences (cDiD) is valid.More specifically, observables such as previous labormarket
performance prior to treatment might control for the unobservable characteristics that
cause a selection bias. One way of applying the matching approach is to weight the most
crucial variables in the estimation in order to balance the two groups so that they look
very similar along observable dimensions. This can be done by coarsened exact matching
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Figure 2 Annual earnings.
(CEM) where the reweighing is done individually on the different confounders depending
on relevance10.
The outcome variable of main interest is the long-run probability of getting employed
in the regular sector, relying on employment status in several periods afterwards, which
will basically capture this long-run performance in the labor market11. The outcome will
be defined as P(Y = 1), the probability of getting employed in the regular sector. An
initial problem is that P(Y = 1) is not observed in the pre-treatment period of 2001
since the criterion in this year is that the individuals under study should be unemployed.
However we do not need outcome data for 2001 as long as we have outcomes for earlier
years such as 2000 and 1999. 1998 will be used as the reference year, the parallel trends
assumption can be tested using data for 1999 and 200012. The main iDiD and cDiD13
models estimated in this paper will be specified as






δτTi,τ + β ′Xi,t + νi,t (2)
and






δτTi,τ + β ′Xi,t + νi,t . (3)
Here, α is the intercept, the ai are the individual dummies, γt is a set of time dummies,
Xi,t is a set of confounders, νi,t is the error term, Ti,ρ = 1[if will be getting treatment],
and Ti,τ = 1[if treated]. Given that there are no anticipation effects (by construction
impossible in this setting) the coefficient of the leads (δρ) should be zero (i.e., parallel
trends) strengthening our causal link hypothesis. Since the matching is performed before
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estimating the equation, we omit any treatment group dummy in Equation (3) since its
coefficient will be zero if the matching was successful. Including a group dummy would,
in that case, only inflate the standard errors while not contributing to the model. The
timing of the treatment is chosen to be 2002 to ensure a long follow-up.
Joining a TWA after the treatment year by either the control or treatment group is
permitted and thus selection is orthogonal to future outcomes. Violating this and in effect
conditioning on future outcomes would lead to a bias of the estimated effect (Fredriksson
and Johansson 2003).
Both groups are identified by being unemployed in 2001, thus a form of matching on
pre-treatment labor market outcomes is already performed here. The control group is
defined as not joining a TWA in 2002 and instead engaging in something else or staying
unemployed. The counterfactual path is then, e.g., taking up studies, dropping out of the
labor force, taking a regular job, etc. No restrictions were put on any outcomes from 2003
to 2008.
The reason for using both iDiD and cDiD (to be described in the following section) is
that we can expect iDiD to give more precise estimates by construction, compared to a
regular DiD by controlling for individual effects rather than two group effects. Also, con-
trolling for unobserved and observed heterogeneity with fixed effects does not prune out
observations like coarsened exact matching (CEM)14 does: CEMmight result in very few
observations. On the other hand, cDiD can, by balancing the two groups, mitigate the bias
occurring when, for instance, the two groups have different age compositions, something
which can give rise to diverging income progressions (steeper for younger people). Using
well-balanced groups it is also more convincing to point at the control groups’ outcome
as the actual counterfactual outcomes since they are the same in all observed aspects. The
drawback then is of course the low number of observations that arise due to tight match-
ing criteria. Contrasting these two methods with each other will also give the reader a feel
for how big the self-selection bias might be in this application.
3.2 Matching
Matching is a technique to overcome the selection bias threatening causal inference. The
approach is, however, not uncontroversial. Evidence pointing in favor of the technique
comes from, e.g., (Dehejia and Wahba 1999), who report a successful non-experimental
analysis on the data in (LaLonde 1986): using matching, they replicate the experimen-
tal impact estimates. (Smith and Todd 2005) criticizes (Dehejia and Wahba 1999), but
conclude that the matching technique is best put in a DiD-design, which is what is done
in the present paper (conditional DiD). A principle conceptual difference between regu-
lar regression estimations and matching estimation is that the latter gives the researcher
greater flexibility in choosing how to aggregate heterogeneous effects, especially when
using the specific technique coarsened exact matching. Since previous work has shown
that the impact TWAs have on individuals differ greatly among groups, this is of great
importance. Due to the explicit and easily manipulated weighting procedure, which is in
the hands of the researcher instead of implicitly in the estimator (as in OLS), matching
makes it easier to estimate the interesting parameters such as the ATT in a stratified way
(Cobb-Clark and Crossley 2003).
The basic idea with matching estimators is that we try to find a ‘twin’ for each individual
taking treatment. This is done by matching on observable characteristics. The idea is that
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if the individuals are very similar in the observables that are related to the outcome and
selection process, the risk of their being different in unobservables that are correlated
with outcome and selection is reduced or even eliminated. In practice, we explicitly try to
calculate the counterfactual untreated outcome E[Y0i].
δ∗i = Y1i − E[Y0i] . (4)
Matching estimations rely on the CIA as discussed earlier. Furthermore, (Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1983) noted that an additional condition was needed, common support: If we define
P(x) as being the probability of getting treatment (T) for an individual with characteristics
x, then the common support condition requires 0 < P(x) < 1, ∀x. This is also called
the overlap condition and it rules out the perfect predictability of T given x; without this
assumption, we have no information to construct our counterfactuals. CEM takes care of
this by construction.
Coarsened exact matching is a member of the Monotonic Imbalance Bounding (MIB)
class of matching methods (further described in (Iacus et al. 2008)). It is a method of
pre-processing data which deals with the ‘curse of dimensionality’15 by coarsening con-
tinuous data into bins where the researcher by in-depth knowledge of the variables at
hand can determine the size of the bins to preserve information and maximize the num-
ber of matches. When the continuous variable is coarsened into bins, matching will take
place on the respective strata and then observations are finally re-weighted according to
the size of their strata. The bin width can be constant (	j) within the variable j or it can
vary within each variable, 	vj , where the v are the cut-off points. Then basically any type of
regression can be performed while including the new weights on the uncoarsened data.
If the matching is exact in a variable—which is done for, e.g., the educational level—then
this confounder is not needed in the regression since the balancing is perfect, unless the
variable is time varying. If the matching is exact only on the coarsened values and/or is
time varying, then the confounder should be included in the regression to control for the
within-bin correlation which most likely will be very small if the bin width (	j) is tightly
defined.
The rationale for using CEM instead of, e.g., propensity score matching, is because
this technique is more transparent, straightforward, by construction deals with the com-
mon support, gives priority to balancing (thus reducing bias and model dependence)
to variance (high precision), meets the congruence principle, is computationally effi-
cient, and reduces the sensitivity to measurement error (which would lead to biased
estimates of the ATT, see (Iacus et al. 2008)). In Figures 5 and 6 in the Appendix, two
kernel density plots over aggregated days in unemployment from 1998 to 2001 and two
histograms over age are graphed before and after matching to give a visual represen-
tation of what is going on in the matching process. The treatment group has a higher
density over the left region of days in unemployment and vice versa over the right
region, this skewness is adjusted through the matching. A similar adjustment takes place
in the variable age, where the treatment group has a lower density in the left region
and vice versa in the right. Notably the sample under study becomes a quite young
sample compared with the population. Since balancing the two groups to each other
changes the average sample characteristics compared to the population, we in effect mea-
sure the sample average treatment effect on the treated (SATT) when applying CEM.
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Matching was performed exactly in 2001—unless otherwise is specified—on gender, level
of education, and marital status; coarsened exact matching on aggregate days in unem-
ployment from 1998 to 200116 (	unemp. = 2 days), age (	age = 5 years), annual earnings in
2000 (	vearnings where v = [0, 5000, 10,000, 15,000, 20,000, 25,000, 30,000, 35,000, 40,000,
60,000, 100,000, 200,000]). For non-western immigrants, the income distribution was
completely different and the following break points were chosen to get a sufficient num-
ber of matches: v= [0, 3000, 10,000, 50,000]. The number of children over age groups
(	vchildrenage where v=[0.5, 1.5, 2.5] and age=[0–3, 4–6, 7–10, 11–15, 16–17, 18+]). When
matching the non-western sample, marital status was not included since it reduced the
number of matches and did not help to establish parallel trends. Region of birth was not
included since it reduced the number of matches severely: if region of birth were included
in the regression, the F-test would not be able to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients
are zero (at the 5% significance level)17.
4 Results
This section will begin with multiple cross-sectional regressions measuring how the sub-
sequent labor market outcome varies over time from the year 2002, followed by brief
results from the iDiD. Lastly, the cDiD design will be contrasted with the iDID results.
4.1 Unmatched results
I first use repeated OLS over the years 2003 to 2008:
Yt,i = αt + βt(TWA)2002,i + γ ′tXt,i + ut,i for t = 2003 : 2008. (5)
Here, Y is either regularly employed, unemployed or employed. Thus each line of Table 7
in the Appendix is a separate regression measuring the effect of joining a TWA in year
2002 on subsequent labor market outcomes.
The estimates in Table 7 in the Appendix hint at a locking-in effect during the first
years, which fades away and becomes insignificant in 2006 and 2007 though still negative.
For unemployment, we find the same mechanical decrease of unemployment in the first
year. Those who joined a TWA have a risk of unemployment in 2003 that is 6.3 percent-
age points lower, but already in 2004 the estimate becomes insignificant. In 2006 and 2007
the estimates once again turn significant. It would, however, be quite a stretch to draw
any inference about that, since the earlier insignificant estimates suggest that we are most
likely picking up something unobserved systematic, e.g., the business cycle. The over-
all probability of employment rises by 0.22 and then hovers around 0.10, implying that
treatment raises the participants’ overall employment rate. The non-western immigrants
section of the table show similar results but with more unfavorable figures compared to
the full sample in all aspects. These results will be contrasted against the more causally
robust cDiD and iDiD estimates.
Making use of the individual DiD design, we estimate the equation for the full sample
and the subsample non-western immigrants18. The estimated coefficients, i.e., the average
treatment effects on the treated (ATT), are seen in Table 8 in the Appendix19. The esti-
mates exhibit a similar pattern as in Table 7 in the Appendix but overall they are more
unfavorable for the stepping stone hypothesis. The results hardly vary when conditioning
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on non-western immigrants, though one could argue that they do not suffer any TWA
stigma20(or, at least, suffer less of a TWA stigma) since the post-treatment estimates on
regular employment are lower than for the full sample and revert back to insignificance
more quickly. When performing the individual DiD estimation on income, the parallel
trends assumption is in the danger zone. Figure 2 suggests a small diverging trend from
1998 to 2001; the individual FE:s do not control for the differences in the pre-existing
trend. This is picked up by the iDiD estimator in Figure 8 in the Appendix and suggests
that the estimates are unreliable. In the following section, matching will prove itself useful
compared to fixed effects in mitigating these sorts of problems.
4.2 Matched results
To measure the overall imbalance in the unmatched dataset, which is visible in Table 2,
we can use the L1 statistic introduced by (Iacus et al. 2008) as a comprehensive
measure of global imbalance. Starting by discretizing the continuous variables by
using a pre-defined binning algorithm21 and binning the variables by the researcher’s
choice. A comparison will be made between the two approaches using the following
statistic










where k is the number of dimensions (or variables), f is the treated, g is the control, and 
 is
the variable imbalance. f
1···
k is then the k-dimensional relative frequency for the treated.
L1 = 0 means perfect balance and L1 = 1 means perfect imbalance. The measure by
itself is not that informative but computing the pre-matching L1 and comparing it to the
post-matching L1 will show if the matching was successful.
The first balancing is done on the full sample where pre-matching L1 = 0.99 and
post-matching L1 = 0.86. The summary statistics reported in Table 5 in the Appendix
exhibit a clear improvement relative to Table 2. Since matching on aggregate days in
unemployment was performed at two-day precision—and not in the intervals specified
in the table—the balanced result cannot be entirely visible in the table (though it can be
viewed in Figure 5 in the Appendix. Country of birth is not perfectly balanced since no
matching was made on that variable. Still, improvement has been made; only the Nordic
countries are unbalanced in the treatment group’s favor (2 percentage points more in
the treatment group). The fact that balancing on some variables gives rise to balanc-
ing on other observable variables adds to the plausibility of the CIA assumption, since
it is not unreasonable to believe that unobserved characteristics also might become bal-
anced. The post balancing results for the subsample non-western immigrants are shown in
Table 6 in the Appendix. The balance is not perfect in the mean Aggregate days in
unemployment but the difference is insignificant. Balancing had not been performed on
country of birth or year of arrival, yet they still balanced after matching. The L1 statistic
equals 1.0 for pre-matching and 0.8 post-matching, an even better improvement than for
the full sample matching. If we compare the L1 statistics and the matched tables to the
unmatched, it is clear that improvements have beenmade. However, the common support
condition implies a substantial reduction in the number of observations, which affects the
precision of the estimates.
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Figure 3 compares the iDiD and the cDiD estimates of the probability of being regularly
employed for the non-western immigrants and the full sample. In Figure 3 the different
sample average effects on the treated (SATT) for the outcome employment are plotted
over time, the estimates for all labor market outcomes are displayed in Table 3. For the full
sample, the probability of regular employment is not significantly different from zero in
2007 while the iDiD estimates were always significantly negative22. Stratification on gen-
der shows that women endure negative regular employment estimates until 2006 while
men’s estimates only remain significant until 2004, see Figure 7 in the Appendix. Another
change that has taken place—compared to the iDiD estimates—is in the regular employ-
ment probability for non-western immigrants, where there is no evidence of a negative
significant effect, which is in line with the theory of a more favorable subsequent labor
market outcome for immigrants than for natives. However, this is rather an absence of
adverse effects than a prevailing positive effect. Notably, the standard errors are large and
the estimated insignificant effect for 2003 might just be due to imprecisions caused by the
reduced number of observations.
The estimates for unemployment (Table 3) are in agreement with the overall employ-
ment results, by never getting anywhere near significantly positive. The cyclical pattern
of unemployment exhibited in the iDiD estimates has been reduced by the matching
process, thus showing a favorable image for TWA’s effect on the transition out of unem-
ployment. Apart from 2005, until 2007 all estimates are significantly negative, hovering
around 0.04 to 0.08.
For instance, joining a TWA in 2002 reduced the probability of getting unemployed by
4 percentage points in 2004. Compared to the iDiD estimates where the unemployment
significantly fluctuated around zero, the cDiD estimates do not. If negative self-selection
was the reason for the cyclical pattern then it seems likely that the matching has miti-
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Table 3 cDiD coefficient estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regular employment Unemployment Employment Regular employment Unemployment Employed
VARIABLES Full sample Full sample Full sample Non-western immigrants Non-western immigrants Non-western immigrants
Treatment × 1999 -0.022 0.007 -0.004 -0.071 0.018 -0.069
(0.024) (0.019) (0.024) (0.056) (0.051) (0.057)
Treatment × 2000 -0.043* 0.003 -0.008 -0.059 0.094 -0.012
(0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.058) (0.058) (0.061)
Treatment × 2002 -0.439*** -0.172*** 0.561*** -0.331*** -0.250*** 0.667***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041)
Treatment × 2003 -0.143*** -0.053*** 0.203*** -0.091 -0.043 0.198***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.024) (0.060) (0.051) (0.058)
Treatment × 2004 -0.097*** -0.038** 0.122*** -0.038 -0.054 0.139**
(0.025) (0.017) (0.024) (0.061) (0.051) (0.058)
Treatment × 2005 -0.063** -0.011 0.073*** -0.036 -0.044 0.119**
(0.025) (0.016) (0.024) (0.061) (0.048) (0.058)
Treatment × 2006 -0.050** -0.048** 0.068*** 0.028 -0.097* 0.117**
(0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.061) (0.057) (0.058)
Treatment × 2007 -0.017 -0.060*** 0.087*** 0.017 -0.154*** 0.146**
(0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.062) (0.056) (0.057)
Treatment × 2008 -0.020 0.004 0.052** 0.044 -0.103** 0.153***
(0.024) (0.014) (0.022) (0.062) (0.045) (0.058)
Observations 40,400 40,400 40,400 3,730 3,730 3,730
R-squared 0.126 0.056 0.140 0.182 0.101 0.230
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Control variables (Xi,t): Age, number of kids over age groups, and dummies for: region of birth, year of arrival, educational orientation and level and social welfare benefit received current year. For the non-western immigrant
sample, region of birth was not included, but dummies for marital status were added.
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for non-western immigrants exhibit an insignificant positive trend before taking treat-
ment, the in-treatment effect is then significantly negative, followed by four consecutive
years of negative insignificant estimates and then two years of significantly negative
estimates. The pattern displayed in the unemployment column for non-western immi-
grants is similar to the full sample unemployment column even though—maybe due to
imprecision—more estimates are insignificant and also the impact is larger. For instance:
in 2007 taking treatment lead to a 15.4 percentage points drop in the probability of
being unemployed for non-western immigrants and 8.7 percentage points for the full
sample.
The overall employment has also changed significantly from the unmatched estimates.
The iDiD estimates where significant at the 5%-level for only two years whereas the cDiD
estimates never go insignificant. The employment columns in Table 3 shows clear cut evi-
dence of a long-run change in the probability of employment for both the full sample and
the immigrant subset. Given that the matching successfully eliminated the self-selection
bias, we can causally interpret this as joining a TWA increases one’s probability of employ-
ment in the long run by approximately 7 to 9 percent points in general and 12 to 15
percent points for non-western immigrants.
Given the effect on employment probability it might also be interesting to take a closer
look at the income progression that one would expect from joining a TWA. Previous
studies usually show that the working conditions in TWAs are worse and that the salaries
are lower than those in regular employment contracts (Jahn 2008). The coarsened exact
matching technique showed itself useful in the income equation where the process purged
out individuals with diverging pre-treatment income trends and reduced the standard
errors. A time trend has also been included in the earnings regression apart from the
other confounders included in the employment status cDiD. Figure 4 and Table 10 in
the Appendix report the estimates. There are no subsequent adverse earnings effects
from joining a TWA. In fact the income progression seem to benefit from TWA employ-
ment, supporting the descriptive results in Figure 2. When stratifying on gender (Figure 4
and Table 10 in the Appendix), it seems as though the effect is mostly driven by women.
Since the parallel trends assumption cannot be empirically supported in the non-western
immigrants sample, the estimates are unreliable.
The estimated effects can at first sight seem a bit large, but there is more than a
wage effect induced by TWA employment driving these estimates. To disentangle the
wage effect of TWA, we can decompose the earnings in the following simple equation:
earnings = P(employment) × wage × (annual)hours. Taking the natural logarithm and
differencing gives
 ln earnings =  ln employment +  lnwage +  ln hours
where
 ln employment ≈ employmentemployment .
Using the full sample estimates from 2008 to exemplify:  ̂employment = 0.056 (Table 3),
 ln ̂earnings = 0.177 (Table 10 in the Appendix) and the average employment rate
(employment2007 = 0.643).
0.177 = 0.0560.643 +  lnwage +  ln hours
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Figure 4 cDiD, percentage change in earnings.
Then subtracting the increased earnings effect stemming from the increased probability
of being employed,
0.177 − 0.087 =  lnwage +  ln hours
0.09 =  lnwage +  ln hours.
This means that the treatment group on average increased their annual earnings by 9% in
2008 compared to those not taking treatment when accounting for employment effects.
Howmuch of this that is an effect of increased working hours rather than a wage increase
is unfortunately not possible to determine with the available data, but presumably the
hours effect dominates. One has to keep this equation in mind when interpreting the
plots.
4.3 Robustness check
To make sure the results do not hinge on the specific timing of treatment (2002) a type of
robustness check was performed: All equations were re-estimated with 2004 as treatment
year instead of 2002. Neither the iDiD nor the cDiD estimator showed a sensitivity to
the treatment timing. The overall pattern was unchanged in all estimations. Two changes
are worth noting though: the unemployment estimates for the cDiD shifted down a few
points, making the estimates significant at all post-treatment years. Secondly, the earnings
estimates shifted upwards, resulting in significantly positive estimates for all panels in the
post-treatment years.
By this I conclude that the reported results most likely are robust since the pattern and
the estimates barely varied when switching treatment year.
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5 Summary
This paper investigates how TWAs affect the subsequent labor market outcomes for
the unemployed in terms of employment status and income. The outcomes have been
re-estimated on non-western immigrants and stratified by gender to control for hetero-
geneous effects. The selection bias associated with TWA studies has been tackled by
individual Differences-in-Differences (iDiD) and conditional Differences-in-Differences
(cDiD). The study was concluded with a robustness check where the sensitivity to the
treatment year was tested. Both estimators were found to be robust.
The most solid result that can be drawn from the estimations is that joining a TWA
(taking treatment) decreases the probability of getting a regular job (TWAs excluded)
for years to come in general but not for non-western immigrants. Conversely, the effect
on overall employment (TWAs included) has a long-run positive effect when using the
matched estimator (only three years with the iDiD). The estimates for unemployment
are only marginally significant at times and fluctuate around zero when estimating an
iDiD, but when matching the groups we found evidence of a positive transition rate out of
unemployment.When stratifying by gender, women showed stronger andmore persistent
negative regular employment effects even though the other outcomes did not diverge
much, suggesting that women tend to stay for longer periods in TWA employment.When
turning to the income estimations, the treatment group seems to have gained a bit from
the TWA in the long-run. Stratification by gender showed that the result is mainly driven
by women.
The evidence provided in this article does not support the stepping stone hypothe-
sis, since regular employment is negatively affected or not affected at all in the medium
and long run. It might on the other hand work as a way to escape unemployment that,
especially if you are a woman, might benefit your future income (though it is not clear if
this is an effect of increased working hours or wages). The TWAs also had a clear long-
run effect on employment probabilities. Compared to the unemployment estimates, the
employment estimates were larger and more stable over time, suggesting that the TWAs
keep individuals from exiting the labor market. This effect, together with the increased
long-run earnings effect, puts the TWI in a quite favorable light. The biggest difference
between the full sample and the non-western immigrants sample is in the regular employ-
ment outcome, where the latter group does not seem to ‘get stuck’ in the TWA to the
same extent as the full sample. However both in the iDiD and in the cDiD the standard
errors are quite large and the lack of a negative regular employment effect might be just
out of imprecision.
It should here be emphasized that the results are valid for people in unemployment;
it is still an open question whether they are valid for a weaker subset (e.g. social assis-
tance recipients) or a stronger subset (e.g. students). External validity is also affected by
the matching process, which distorts the sample’s characteristics to some extent. In this
case, for instance, the results are first and foremost applicable to a younger subset of the
population.
Endnotes
1 TWA employment as a share of total employment. There is reason to believe that the




Hveem IZA Journal of Migration Page 17 of 27
2 The definition of non-western immigrants in (Jahn and Rosholm 2012) is narrower
than in the present paper, thus the results are not completely comparable.
3 (Bennmarker et al. 2009) find significant positive effects for immigrants on time in
employment after participating in a private job placement agency compared to the
public employment service, indicating that immigrants might benefit more from private
options, arguably due to the increased access to norms and networks on the Swedish
labor market.
4 Non-western immigrants: Born in Africa, South America, Asia, the Soviet Union, or
other European countries (i.e., excluding the Nordic countries and EU15).
5 The entire database presently holds annual registers since 1990 and includes all
individuals 16 years of age or older that were registered in Sweden as of December 31 for
each year.
6 To increase the computational efficiency, the control group was a 20% random
sample, drawn from the population (excluding individuals in TWAs 2001) before any
other restriction was put on the group.
7 Meaning, in effect, that they are at most 63 in the last year, 2008.
8 Examples of counterfactual outcomes in 2002 could be: taking up studies, getting a
regular job, or continuing their unemployment spell, etc.
9 This data problem is common to all register-based TWA research.
10 The technique is outlined in (Iacus et al. 2008) and (Blackwell et al. 2009).
11 Estimations will also be performed on unemployment, overall employment, and
annual earnings. But the focus will be on regular employment for simplicity.
12 This time span might be considered a bit short, but I have also been running a
probit on the entire working population and predicting values for 2001: they all support
the parallel trends assumption together with the years 1999 and 2000, however since
that approach is unorthodox it has not been included and the model does not rely on
these results at all.
13 Conditional Differences-in-Differences, i.e., DiD performed on a matched data
set.
14 This matching technique is described in Section 3.2.
15 Matching on a continuous variable will in effect rule out any matches.
16 Serves as a measure of labor market attachment.
17 Four regions of birth dummies in a joint hypothesis test give P-value > 0.05
and inclusion of them actually increases the standard errors on the treatment variables
while leaving the estimates unaffected.
18 Stratification is also done by gender but no large diverging results were found, the
estimates can be found in Table 9 in the Appendix.
19 Standard errors were clustered on the individual level to account for possible serial
correlation.
20 Having worked at a TWAmight signal low ability and regular employers might then
shy away from these employees
21 The default coarsening algorithm by the matching software is the Scott break
method: 	scott = 3.5
√
s¯2nn−1/3, where n denotes the sample size and
√
s¯2n the sample
standard deviation (Scott 1992).
22 Standard errors were clustered on the individual level to account for possible serial
correlation.
23 Register based labor market statistics.
24 SNI 2007 Standard for Swedish industrial classification 2007.
Appendix A. Tables
Table 4, 5, 6 show descriptive statistics. Table 7 shows parameter estimates of the mul-
tiple OLS regressions. Table 8, 9 shows parameter estimates of the full iDiD regressions
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and stratified on gender. Table 10 shows the cDiD parameter estimates from the wage
equation.
Table 4 Summary statistics for 2001, non-western immigrants
Group Differences in mean
Control Treatment Coefficient t-statistic
Gender
Male 58.5 76.1 0.177 (5.73)***
Female 41.5 23.9 -0.177 (-5.73)***











Age groups 36 32 -3.905 (-6.04)***
16–20 4.1 10.9 0.069 (3.11)***
21–25 10.9 19.4 0.085 (3.01)***
26–30 13.2 12.4 -0.008 (-0.32)
31–35 17.3 18.9 0.016 (0.56)
36–40 19.2 15.9 -0.033 (-1.26)
41–45 17.4 14.4 -0.030 (-1.18)
46–50 11.6 5.0 -0.066 (-4.14)***
51–55 6.3 3.0 -0.033 (-2.66)***
Country of birth
Other European countries 32.5 31.8 -0.007 (-0.21)
Africa 10.4 10.4 0.001 (0.03)
South America 6.9 8.0 0.010 (0.53)
Asia 49.4 48.8 -0.007 (-0.18)
Soviet Union 0.7 1.0 0.003 (0.36)
Highest education level
Primary school less than 9 years 10.7 5.5 -0.052 (-3.14)***
Primary school 9 (10) years 15.8 15.4 0.004 (-0.16)
Upper secondary 2 years or less 25.6 22.9 -0.027 (-0.90)
Upper secondary 2 years or more 23.7 30.8 0.071 (2.15)**
Higher education less than 3 years 9.4 10.4 0.010 (0.46)
Higher education 3 years or more 11.3 10.9 -0.003 (-0.14)
Post-graduate education 0.6 1.0 0.004 (0.60)
Unknown 2.9 3.0 0.001 (0.11)
Year of arrival
1936–1965 0.4 0.0 -0.004 (-4.59)***
1966–1972 2.8 0.5 -0.023 (-4.20)***
1973–1985 19.9 14.9 -0.050 (-1.95)*
1986–1993 48.5 52.2 0.038 (1.06)
1994–2001 28.4 32.3 0.039 (1.17)
Resides in a large city
Stockholm 20.3 32.3 0.121 (3.61)***
Gothenburg 22.4 28.9 0.065 (1.99)**
Malmoe 21.0 10.0 -0.111 (-5.06)***
Other 36.3 28.9 -0.075 (-2.29)**
Number of observations 5,427 201 5,628
Robust standard errors.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5 Summary statistics for 2001, matched sample
Group Differences in mean
Control Treatment Coefficient t-statistic
Gender
Male 69.9 69.9 0.000 (0.00)
Female 30.1 30.1 0.000 (0.00)
Aggregate days in 332 331 -0.790 (-0.07)
unemployment 1998–2001
0 0.4 0.4 0.4
1–30 2.9 1.6 2.7
31–90 10.1 12.3 10.4
91–182 19.1 18.1 18.9
183–274 16.5 15.4 16.4
275–364 14.0 13.9 14.0
365–730 29.1 31.3 29.4
731–1094 7.5 6.5 7.4
1095–1457 0.4 0.4 0.4
Age groups 30 30 0.043 (0.09)
16–20 12.9 12.9 -0.000 (-0.00)
21–25 30.1 30.1 0.000 (0.00)
26–30 21.0 21.0 -0.000 (-0.00)
31–35 13.6 13.6 -0.000 (-0.00)
36–40 7.2 7.2 -0.000 (-0.00)
41–45 7.4 7.4 -0.000 (-0.00)
46–50 3.8 3.8 -0.000 (-0.00)
51–55 4.0 4.0 -0.000 (-0.00)
Country of birth
Sweden 82.6 82.1 -0.006 (-0.29)
Nordic countries (except Sweden) 1.1 3.3 0.0214 (2.75)***
EU12 0.4 0.5 0.002 (0.40)
Other European countries 4.9 4.0 -0.009 (-0.79)
Africa 2.4 1.4 -0.009 (-1.31)
North America 0.4 0.5 0.001 (0.34)
South America 1.1 1.1 -0.000 (-0.00)
Asia 7.0 7.1 0.001 (0.07)
Oceania 0.0 0.0 -0.000 (-1.00)
Soviet Union 0.1 0.0 -0.001 (-1.41)
Highest education level
Primary school less than 9 years 0.5 0.5 0.000 (0.00)
Primary school 9 (10) years 12.7 12.7 0.000 (0.00)
Upper secondary 2 years or less 28.6 28.6 0.000 (0.00)
Upper secondary 2 years or more 42.0 42.0 0.000 (0.00)
Higher education less than 3 years 7.8 7.8 0.000 (0.00)
Higher education 3 years or more 8.2 8.2 0.000 (0.00)
Unknown 0.2 0.2 0.000 (0.00)
Resides in a large city
Stockholm 15.0 15.0 0.000 (0.00)
Gothenburg 22.1 22.1 0.000 (0.00)
Malmoe 10.5 10.5 -0.000 (-0.00)
Other 52.4 52.4 -0.000 (-0.00)
Number of observations 3,488 552 4,040
Robust standard errors.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 6 Summary statistics for 2001, non-western immigrants matched sample
Group Differences in mean
Control Treatment Coefficient t-statistic
Gender
Male 82.7 82.7 -0.000 (-0.00)
Female 17.3 17.3 0.000 (0.00)











Age groups 31 31 0.270 (0.27)
16–20 9.2 9.2 -0.000 (-0.00)
21–25 24.5 24.5 0.000 (0.00)
26–30 13.3 13.3 -0.000 (-0.00)
31–35 25.5 25.5 0.000 (0.00)
36–40 11.2 11.2 0.000 (0.00)
41–45 14.3 14.3 0.000 (0.00)
46–50 2.0 2.0 0.000 (0.00)
Country of birth
Other European countries 27.2 32.7 0.055 (0.90)
Africa 18.1 13.3 -0.048 (-1.23)
South America 6.1 7.1 0.011 (0.001)
Asia 46.9 46.9 0.001 (0.01)
Soviet Union 1.8 0.0 -0.018 (-1.54)
Highest education level
Primary school less than 9 years 4.1 4.1 -0.000 (-0.00)
Primary school 9 (10) years 16.3 16.3 0.000 (0.00)
Upper secondary 2 years or less 22.4 22.4 -0.000 (-0.00)
Upper secondary 2 years or more 36.7 36.7 -0.000 (-0.00)
Higher education less than 3 years 8.2 8.2 0.000 (0.00)
Higher education 3 years or more 9.2 9.2 0.000 (0.00)
Unknown 3.1 3.1 0.000 (0.00)
Year of arrival
1936–1965 0.4 0.0 -0.004 (-1.20)
1966–1972 1.6 1.0 -0.005 (-0.37)
1973–1985 18.5 17.3 -0.012 (-0.24)
1986–1993 51.0 42.9 -0.082 (-1.27)
1994–2001 28.4 38.8 0.103 (1.66)*
Resides in a large city
Stockholm 34.7 34.7 0.00 (0.00)
Gothenburg 27.8 27.8 0.00 (0.00)
Malmoe 6.9 6.9 -0.00 (-0.00)
Other 30.6 30.6 0.00 (0.00)
Number of observations 275 98 373
Robust standard errors.











Table 7Multiple OLS regressions
Independent variable: TWA
Full sample Non-western immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTCOME YEAR P(Regular emp.) P(Unemployment) P(Employment) P(Regular emp.) P(Unemployment) P(Employment)
2003 -0.128*** -0.063*** 0.217*** -0.155*** -0.013 0.148***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.035) (0.027) (0.034)
2004 -0.094*** -0.018 0.121*** -0.105*** 0.026 0.073**
(0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.035) (0.028) (0.034)
2005 -0.051*** -0.010 0.090*** -0.076** 0.004 0.061*
(0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.036) (0.027) (0.034)
2006 -0.026* -0.072*** 0.095*** -0.035 -0.052* 0.062*
(0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.036) (0.031) (0.033)
2007 -0.005 -0.078*** 0.104*** -0.021 -0.080*** 0.083***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.035) (0.030) (0.032)
2008 0.007 -0.013 0.089*** -0.039 0.010 0.051
(0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.036) (0.024) (0.033)
Observations 26,111 26,111 26,111 5,628 5,628 5,628
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Control variables: Number of children over six different age groups, and dummies for: gender, world region of birth, parents born abroad, labor market region, educational level, marital status, year of arrival, age groups, social
















Table 8 iDiD coefficient estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regular employment Unemployment Employment Regular employment Unemployment Employment
Variables Full sample Full sample Full sample non-western immigrants non-western immigrants non-western immigrants
Treatment × 1999 -0.009 0.017 -0.002 0.010 0.050 0.007
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.032) (0.040) (0.032)
Treatment × 2000 -0.006 -0.003 0.028 0.008 0.057 0.062
(0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.037) (0.045) (0.040)
Treatment × 2002 -0.461*** -0.153*** 0.529*** -0.362*** -0.169*** 0.623***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Treatment × 2003 -0.184*** -0.008 0.156*** -0.144*** 0.033 0.152***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.043) (0.038) (0.046)
Treatment × 2004 -0.156*** 0.045*** 0.053** -0.086** 0.077** 0.082*
(0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.044) (0.039) (0.045)
Treatment × 2005 -0.114*** 0.055*** 0.021 -0.070 0.063* 0.057
(0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.044) (0.037) (0.044)
Treatment × 2006 -0.087*** -0.037** 0.028 -0.036 -0.016 0.054
(0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.048) (0.042) (0.048)
Treatment × 2007 -0.060*** -0.047*** 0.043** -0.013 -0.053 0.084*
(0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.046) (0.040) (0.045)
Treatment × 2008 -0.046** 0.042*** 0.030 -0.027 0.052 0.053
(0.022) (0.015) (0.021) (0.048) (0.037) (0.047)
Observations 261,110 261,110 261,110 56,280 56,280 56,280
R-squared 0.424 0.264 0.431 0.422 0.248 0.428
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Control variables (Xi,t): Dummies for labor market region, education level, educational orientation, marital status, age groups, social welfare benefit received current year.
















Table 9 iDiD, stratified on gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regular employment Unemployment Employment Regular employment Unemployment Employment
Variables Women Women Women Men Men Men
Treatment × 1999 -0.031 0.031 -0.024 0.004 0.010 0.010
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Treatment × 2000 -0.033 -0.005 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.042
(0.034) (0.027) (0.033) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026)
Treatment × 2002 -0.502*** -0.113*** 0.488*** -0.437*** -0.174*** 0.554***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.028) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020)
Treatment × 2003 -0.200*** -0.002 0.166*** -0.176*** -0.010 0.148***
(0.038) (0.024) (0.035) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027)
Treatment × 2004 -0.177*** 0.060** 0.060* -0.145*** 0.039* 0.048*
(0.037) (0.025) (0.036) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027)
Treatment × 2005 -0.124*** 0.059** 0.022 -0.109*** 0.056*** 0.019
(0.039) (0.026) (0.037) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027)
Treatment × 2006 -0.110*** -0.055** 0.030 -0.075*** -0.023 0.027
(0.038) (0.027) (0.035) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026)
Treatment × 2007 -0.068* -0.065** 0.059* -0.056** -0.032 0.034
(0.037) (0.027) (0.033) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026)
Treatment × 2008 -0.021 0.016 0.061* -0.058** 0.060*** 0.015
(0.036) (0.022) (0.033) (0.027) (0.020) (0.026)
Observations 111,591 111,591 111,591 149,519 149,519 149,519
R-squared 0.426 0.260 0.433 0.426 0.267 0.433
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Control variables (Xi,t): Dummies for labor market region, education orientation level, marital status, age groups and social welfare benefit received current year.
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Table 10 cDiD coefficient estimates corresponding to Figure 4
Percentage change in earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Full sample Women Men Non-western immigrants
Treatment × 1999 -0.101 -0.135 -0.059 -0.844***
(0.081) (0.137) (0.100) (0.277)
Treatment × 2000 -0.028 -0.059 -0.009 -0.133
(0.077) (0.131) (0.095) (0.248)
Treatment × 2002 0.816*** 0.954*** 0.746*** 1.158***
(0.058) (0.117) (0.063) (0.182)
Treatment × 2003 0.383*** 0.467*** 0.342*** 0.568***
(0.065) (0.125) (0.075) (0.203)
Treatment × 2004 0.292*** 0.481*** 0.201** 0.317
(0.075) (0.130) (0.088) (0.193)
Treatment × 2005 0.119* 0.172 0.082 0.368*
(0.072) (0.125) (0.087) (0.207)
Treatment × 2006 0.074 0.041 0.078 0.161
(0.068) (0.132) (0.075) (0.177)
Treatment × 2007 0.256*** 0.274** 0.228*** 0.574***
(0.061) (0.111) (0.072) (0.190)
Treatment × 2008 0.177*** 0.298*** 0.091 0.364**
(0.060) (0.108) (0.071) (0.179)
Observations 28,891 7,431 21,460 2,443
R-squared 0.219 0.193 0.256 0.274
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Control variables (Xi,t): Age, number of kids over age groups and dummies for: region of birth, year of arrival, educational
orientation, social welfare benefit received current year and level, and a linear time trend.
Standard errors were clustered on individual level to account for possible serial correlation.
Appendix B. Figures
Figure 5, 6 show the effect of matching on the selected variables aggregate days in unem-
ployment and age. Figure 7, 8 plots the cDiD estimated coefficients of the employment
status stratified by gender, and the iDiD estimates of the wage equation. The section ends
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Figure 5 Kernel density plot over aggregate days in unemployment, 1998–2001.
2013, 2:21
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/21
















20 30 40 50 60
Age
Control group
No obs. per year 25158
Treatment Group















20 30 40 50 60
Age
Control group
No obs. per year 3488
Treatment Group
No obs. per year 552
Matched











1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Women











1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Men







































1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year













1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
95 % C.I. Year−treatment effects
Men
Change in P(Employment)
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Figure 8 iDiD, percentage change in earnings.
Appendix C. Description of outcome variables
Regular employment defined as all working in November in the employment register.
The official definition of being employed in RAMS23 closely tries to follow the ILO defini-
tion, meaning that if any income-generating labor has been performed during the week of
measurement that is regarded as being employed (includes income from own business).
In addition to this, all TWA workers are excluded to define regular employment.
Unemployment defined as searching for a job at the unemployment offices at the end
of November including those registered in a labor market program.
TWA employment defined as working at a TWA in November. The TWA definition is
number 78 in the SNI 200724.
Total employment defined as regular employment but not excluding TWA
employment.
Earnings defined as total gross annual reported income from work, recorded by the tax
office.
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